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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
SEGREGATION IN TRANSPORTATION: SUBSTANTIVE
AND REMEDIAL PROBLEMS
Ironically, transportation, where the separate but equal doctrine orig-
inated, now looms as the last foothold1 of this dying "Jim Crow" device.
Granted Supreme Court recognition sixty years ago,2 the doctrine is
basic to all existing segregation laws. Thus, a review of the separate but
equal philosophy is necessary in determining the present status of the
Negro's rights in transportation, and in examining the remedies available
to redress a violation of those rights.
The Civil War destroyed the traditional forms of control which had
developed under the slave regime and left most of the Negroes ill-equipped
to adjust to their new station in the community. The new citizens were
poorly educated, unaccustomed to freedom, and generally incapable of
their own support.' To control the newly emancipated masses the south-
ern states enacted the New Black Codes which, despite the argument that
chaotic conditions warranted special legislation, were clearly attempts to
return, at least partially, to slavery.4 Congress, now under the control of
the Radical Republicans,' countered with the first of the civil rights legis-
lation, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which gave the Negro citizenship,
property rights, and the right to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings.'
Before the validity of the act was tested,7 it was superseded by the
fourteenth amendment which guaranteed citizenship, equal protection of
1. The Supreme Court recently discredited the doctrine in both public educational
and recreational facilities. See The School Segregation cases, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1955), affirming 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. See FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 126 (1949), for a general de-
scription of the problems existing immediately after the Civil War.
4. Mississippi practically re-enacted its slave code when it declared "that all the
penal and criminal laws now in force in this State, defining offenses, and prescribing
the mode of punishment for crimes and misdemeanors committed by slaves, free Negroes
or mulattoes, be and the same are hereby re-enacted, and declared to be in full force and
effect, against freedmen, free Negroes, and mulattoes, except so far as the mode and
manner of trial and punishment have been changed or altered by law." Quoted in
DuBoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 177 (1935). Other southern states fol-
lowed the example of Mississippi in limiting the movement and rights of the freedmen.
See I FLEIiNG, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 243-312 (1906).
5. For a detailed treatment of legislation under the Radicals, see WARSOFF, EQuAL-
ITY AND THE LAW 50-148 (1938).
6. 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1952).
7. There was some disagreement in the lower courts as to the validity of the act.
Although Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 5 (1867), held the act was unauthorized,
most of the lower courts seemed to admit that the act was valid. See, e.g., Frasher v.
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the law, and the right to due process.' Additional measures designed to
secure to the colored race the full rights of citizenship were: The fif-
teenth amendment, safeguarding the right to vote;9 the Civil Rights Act
of 1870 in which the statute of 1866 was re-enacted to provide a sanction
for the fourteenth amendment ;"O and the Ku Klux Klan Act, to control
an organization that had become a major problem."
All the prior legislation proving ineffective, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 18752 which sought to secure to all persons the "full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and
other places of public amusement."' 3 While the lower courts were in con-
flict over the constitutionality of this act,' 4 the Supreme Court held it
invalid in 1883 and, practically, ended attempts by Congress to settle the
Negro problem.' "
The constitutionality of state regulation of segregation in transpor-
tation was first litigated in 1877, when a Negro woman brought an action
under a Louisana Reconstruction statute which forbade discrimination in
transportation on account of race.' Chief Justice Waite, speaking for
the Court, accepted the interpretation of the state's highest court that the
State, 3 TEx. APP. 263 (1877); Hart v. Hoss & Elder, 26 LA. ANN. 90 (1874) ; State v.
Hairston, 63 N.C. 451 (1869) ; Ellis v. State, 42 ALA. 525 (1868).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. U.S. COHsT. amend. XV.
10. 16 STAT. 144 (1870).
11. 17 STAT. 13 (1871).
12. 18 STAT. 335 (1875). See Cocke, The Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Law,
1 N.S. So. L. I\.v. 193 (1875), where a contemporary southerner gives his reasons for
believing the act to be invalid.
13. 18 STAT. 335, 336 (1875).
14. See MANGUm, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 28-29 (1940), for a discus-
sion of the cases for and against the act.
15. The Civil Rights cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). These were five cases arising
under the act of 1875. Two were indictments for denying accommodations in a hotel;
two were for denying accommodations in a theater; and one was for denying accommo-
dations in a railroad car. The validity of the act was defended under the power of Con-
gress to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.
The Court held the act not to be justified by either, the thirteenth amendment prohibit-
ing only slavery and the fourteenth amendment dealing with the acts of states, not with
the private actions of individuals regulated by the law in question. These cases did not
decide whether Congress could pass similar legislation regulating only public convey-
ances in interstate commerce. However, in Butts v. Merchants and Miners Transp. Co.,
230 U.S. 126 (1913), where a Negro sought to apply the act to segregation on an inter-
state vessel, the Court held that the Civil Rights cases declared the law. The act showed
on its face that it was not based on the commerce clause, so it could not be justified
thereby.
16. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877). The statute involved provided that all
persons engaged within the state as common carriers should have the right to refuse to
admit any person, .provided that its rules made no discrimination on account of race or
color. LA. REv. STAT. p. 93 (1870).
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law included interstate carriers traveling through Louisiana and ruled it
unconstitutional as state interference with the commerce power of Con-
gress.' 7 This ruling cleared the way for states to pass valid segregation
laws limited, by state interpretation, to intrastate carriers.' Private com-
panies, however, remained free to adopt reasonable regulations for pas-
sengers in interstate commerce, when there was no federal legislation. 9
Only recently has the constitutionality of these statutes been ques-
tioned.2" The typical state segregation statute requires all carriers doing
business within the state to separate the races in one of three ways: (1)
provide separate cars; (2) divide cars into sections by partitions; or (3)
provide special seating arrangements that effectively separate the races.
In all cases accommodations are to be "equal." Generally, the carrier also
must furnish separate terminal facilities for each race. All the statutes
empower the conductor or operator to enforce the segregation provi-
sions."
Not until 1896 was the Supreme Court required to consider whether
separate but equal facilities satisfied the requirements of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2  In Plessy v. Fergusonj13
the Court upheld a Louisiana statute requiring segregation in railroad
travel as a reasonable exercise of the police power under the discretion
granted the state legislature. Mr. Justice Brown, for the majority, ad-
mitted that the amendment was intended "to enforce the absolute equality
of the two races before the law," but denied that it could have been in-
tended "to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a
commingling of the races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."'24 Despite
17. The Chief Justice explained that while the statute purported to control carriers
only while within the state, it necessarily influenced their conduct to some extent
throughout their entire voyage. Any statute which seeks to impose a direct burden on
interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, encroaches on the exclu-
sive power of Congress. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 551 (1877).
18. Cf. L.N.O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
19. See Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 71 (1910), where the Su-
preme Court held that with regard to the acts of private persons, the distinction between
interstate and intrastate carriers is unimportant, stating that congressional inaction is
equivalent to a declaration that a carrier may separate white and Negro interstate pas-
sengers.
20. See discussion, infra p. 291.
21. See ALA. CODE tit. 48, §§ 196, 198 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. 73-1747, 1218
(1947) ; FLA. STAT. 352.03 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-205, 207 (1947); Ky. RFv.
STAT. § 276.440 (1953) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 45-528 (1950); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 7785,
7786 (1942) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.71 (1950) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 181 (1951) :
S.C. CODE §§ 58.1491-1496 (1952) ; TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1659-60 (1948) ; VA. CODE
§§ 56-326-330, 390-404 (1950).
22. The so-called separate but equal doctrine was first voiced in a state education
case, Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849).
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24. 163 U.S. at 544.
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Justice Harlan's vigorous dissenting opinionr this decision became the
basis of legality for Jim Crow laws.20
Fifty years elapsed before the Supreme Court fully reversed its atti-
tude toward segregation in transportation.27 Until 1946 no state statute
forbidding segregation had been upheld,2" nor had any statute requiring
segregation been invalidated. 21 In Morgan v. Virgina'0 the Court invali-
dated as a burden on interstate commerce a state law requiring all vehicle
carriers operating within the state to separate white and colored passen-
gers. The Court ruled that a statute which requires passengers to change
seats when a carrier crosses a state line burdens those passengers and
infringes upon the requirement of national uniformity of regulations.
The decision made doubtful the validity of any state law which required
an interstate passenger to change seats in any type of commercial trans-
portation.3
The separate but equal doctrine also dictated, until 1950, the mean-
ing of "equality" under the Interstate Commerce Act, section 3 (1).2 In
Henderson v. United States"2 the Supreme Court reversed the decisions
of both the Interstate Commerce Commission34 and the district court"3
upholding a carrier's dining car segregation regulation. The Court,
expressly refusing a decision on the constitutionality of segregation, held
that the regulation, under which Negro passengers were refused service
25. 163 U.S. at 552. In his opinion Justice Harlan stated, "[Ifn the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law." 163 U.S. at
559.
26. McCabe v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 160 (1914), emphasized the
firmness with which segregation was intrenched in transportation under the Plessy doc-
trine. Chief Justice Hughes, upholding an Oklahoma segregation statute, declared that
since Plessy v. Ferguson the question can no longer be considered an open one. It was
not an infraction of the fourteenth amendment for a state to require separate but equal
accommodations for the two races.
27. The forewarning of the change was Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80,
(1941), where the Court required a more rigid compliance with the "equality" term of
separate but equal. Also, in 1938, the attack on separate but equal began in public edu-
cation facilities, but the doctrine was not discredited until 1954. See note 38 infrct.
28. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
29. See McCabe v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896); L.N.O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
30. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
31. While the Court's decision was carefully limited to buses, its reasoning is easily
extended to include otheK means of transportation. The inconvenience of changing seats
is no more peculiar to buses than it is to trains, boats, and planes.
32. See Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). Section 3(1) provides that
no carrier shall subject any person to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvan-
tage. 24 STAT. 379, 380 (1887) 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1952).
33. 339 U.S. 816 (1950). For a complete background of this case, see note 74 infra.
34. Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 269 I.C.C. 73 (1947).
35. Henderson v. I.C.C., 80 F. Supp. 32 (D. Md. 1948).
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at all but two tables, allowed an undue discrimination forbidden by the
act. This ruling made it impossible for any interstate carrier to reserve
a specific area for the use of whites and, at the same time, maintain the
non-discriminatory regulations required by the act. Lower courts have
used the commerce clause to effect the same result.36
On November 25, 1955, the Interstate Commerce Commission, be-
latedly recognizing the impact of the Henderson decision, ruled that racial
segregation on train and bus travel in interstate commerce violates the
Interstate Commerce Act." It declared unlawful the separation of Ne-
groes and whites not only while traveling, but also while in carrier-owned
terminal facilities, e.g., waiting rooms, station restaurants, and wash-
rooms, thus barring all interstate segregation practices.
Separate but equal has been obviated not only in interstate commerce
but also in the purely local area of education. As in the transportation
cases, the Court, until 1954, avoided any ruling on the validity of that
principle in education.38 Then, in the School Segregation cases,3" the
Supreme Court met Plessy v. Ferguso.4 directly for the first time. Be-
cause the physical facilities available to the Negro and white students
were identical, the Court could not use tangible inequalities to avoid the
constitutional issue. A unanimous Court held that separate educational
facilities in the public schools are inherently unequal and constitute a
denial of equal protection. Thus, the Plessy case, its precedents almost
entirely early school segregation cases, has become a rule without a
reason.
4 1
36. In 1949, the Sixth Circuit employed the Interstate Commerce Act and the com-
merce clause to hold invalid a carrier regulation under which a Negro had been required
to occupy a back seat in the defendant's bus. The court ruled that the regulation con-
stituted a burden on commerce and furnished no immunity to the carrier for damages
which flowed from its enforcement. Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1949). In Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879, 883 (4th Cir. 1951), the court
said, "[W]e know of no principle of law which requires the courts to strike down a
state statute which interferes with interstate commerce but to uphold a railroad regula-
tion which is infected with the same vice."
37. See National Assn. for Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry. Co., 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2234 (Nov. 29, 1955).
38. The attack on separate but equal in education began in 1938. In a group of
cases involving segregation in graduate study, the Court made equality so difficult to
attain that the practical result was the abolition of the Plessy doctrine in the area. See
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) ; Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a general discussion of the problems that faced the
Court in these cases see Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 377 (1954).
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. See 163 U.S. at 545 for a listing of the school segregation cases cited by the
majority. One group of non-school cases, a string of state and lower federal court deci-
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In public recreation as well, separate but equal has collapsed. On
November 8, 1955, the Court reversed without opinion a lower court
decision applying the Plessy doctrine to a suit to enjoin the city of Atlanta
from making racial distinction in allocating public golf facilities.42 At
the same time, the Court affirmed without opinion a case holding that
segregation of public beach facilities is not a proper exercise of the state's
police power.4" The lower court, cited by the Supreme Court, had ruled
that because the authority of earlier cases upholding segregation had been
swept away by the School Segregation cases, the races could not lawfully
be separated in recreational facilities."
The effect of these decisions on segregation in intrastate transpor-
tation will be seen when Flemming v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.4"
is decided by the Supreme Court. In an action for damages under the
Civil Rights Act" against a city bus company whose driver forced a
Negro to change seats in accordance with a state segregation statute, the
Fourth Circuit reversed a judgment for the defendant, saying "the prin-
ciple applied in the school cases should be applied in cases involving
transportation."4 7 Should Flemming be affirmed, the fourteenth amend-
ment will bar state segregation of intrastate passengers.
As these cases illustrate, segregation is not a proper governmental
function. Neither a state nor a private carrier is free to segregate its
passengers in interstate commerce. However, in wholly intrastate facili-
ties where private regulations without state authorization require sepa-
ration, neither fourteenth amendment nor commerce clause limitations
apply.48 There may be, however, effective non-governmental "cures" for
intrastate segregation by private companies. In Montgomery, Alabama,
on December 5, 1955, eighty to ninety percent of the Negro population
began a boycott of a city bus line which caused the arrest of a Negro
sions, was cited in Plessy as upholding statutes requiring segregation on carriers, but an
examination of those cases reveals that not one of them is actually in point. See Waite,
The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 MINN. L. REv. 219, 248-251 (1946).
42. Holmes v. Atlanta, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1955), re'versing 124
F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
43. Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S.
Nov. 8, 1955), affirming 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
44. 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955).
45. 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal docketed, No. 511, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3138
(U.S. Nov. 8, 1955).
46. See discussion, infra p. 292.
47. 224 F.2d at 753.
48. No federal limitation is directly applicable to city bus, taxi, and streetcar com-
panies. For a possible solution to the problem in this area, see discussion, infra pp. 294-95.
However, the gas stations, restaurants, and other facilities used by Negroes traveling in
private automobiles may require segregation under private rules, subject to no govern-
mental limitations other than state law.
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passenger who had disregarded a driver's order to move to the rear of the
bus. The boycott was to be continued until colored bus riders were no
longer "intimidated, embarrassed, and coerced."49 What the federal gov-
ernment cannot touch, private economic pressure may be able to correct
in southern states where the Negro race is a substantial, and sometimes
major, segment of the population.
Of course, resort should be first made to the available legal reme-
dies. The Civil Rights Acte' provides one such remedy. It allows actions
to redress invasions of rights and immunities secured by the Constitution,
including those preserved by the equal protection clause." The options
under this act may be grouped into two general categories: ( 1 ) damages;
and (2) declaratory judgment and injunction. 2
To maintain an action for damages one need only have suffered the
deprivation of his personal liberty protected by the Constitution. The
amount of damages the plaintiff recovers is always entrusted to the de-
termination of a jury.53 The abstruse value of civil rights and the attitude
of juries in the South, where the majority of these cases will undoubtedly
arise, will play an important part in determining the effectiveness of this
remedy. Considering the general -attitude of white southerners, it is
doubtful that the Negro can expect liberal damages in these actions
where the amount of the judgment is left entirely to a jury."
If there is no adequate remedy at law, a Negro who has been denied
equal privileges may bring an action for an injunction. While this remedy
may be used separately, in segregation cases it is often used in conjunction
with a declaratory judgment. Generally, a plaintiff asks the court to de-
clare a practice discriminatory and violative of his civil rights, and re-
quests that an injunction restraining further invasion of those rights be
49. Louisville Courier-Journal, Dec. 6, 1955, p. 1, col. 7.
50. The act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27 (1866), was re-enacted by the second Civil Rights
Act, passed in 1870 to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 16 STAT.
140, amended, 16 STAT. 433 (1870). The third Civil Rights Act, 1871, became, with a
few changes of the arrangement of clauses, the act of today which provides that every
person who, under color of law, deprives any person of "any rights, privileges, or im-
munities" secured by the Constitution or law shall be "liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." REv. STAT. § 1983
(1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952).
51. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 526 (1939).
52. In all actions under the statute, jurisdiction resides in the federal district
courts without allegation or proof of any amount in controversy. Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161 (1943).
53. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 65 (1900).
54. Whether damage actions will have any great deterrent effect upon southern
carriers will depend upon the size and the number of verdicts. Should the plaintiff in
the Flemming case collect the $25,000 she seeks, the effect should be substantial. It is
probable, however, that Negroes will have to resort to other remedies to discourage wide-
spread segregation practices.
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issued. These devices have been used successfully in recreation and edu-
cation cases " and are well suited to preventing segregation in transpor-
tation. The injunction serves the individual plaintiff by requiring the
carrier to change his practice with respect to him and all Negroes similarly
situated, and thereby forces the carrier to amend his policy toward the
entire race. While only parties to the suit can enforce the decree, the
practical effect is the abolition of segregation on that line.
Since these proceedings are aimed at redressing individual wrongs,
the position of the race will improve only if the benefits of a decree indi-
rectly inure to all other Negroes. Federal Rule 23 provides for a class
action, by which representatives of a group may sue to secure the rights of
all members."6 The primary difficulty in applying the rule to segregation
cases arises in determining the "character of the right" sought to be
enforced. Rule 23 (a) (1) provides for the "true class suit" wherein, but
for the class action, the joinder of all interested parties would be essential
to the action." This section allows any member of the class to come in
and enforce a favorable judgment."s
Suits by minority groups to secure constitutional rights are placed
in another category, that of the "spurious class suit."59 This type of class
action is merely a permissive joinder device, used where the right is "sev-
eral" and there exists a common question of law or fact.6" A decree under
this category is not binding upon all members of the class; it binds only
those before the court."' While a favorable decree, generally speaking,
may not be enforced by members of the class not present in court,62 the
55. Recreation: Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1955) ; Holmes
v. Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), rev'd per curiam, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128
(U.S. Nov. 8, 1955); Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951). Education:
Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 120 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. La. 1954);
Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950) ; Davis v. Cook, 80
F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). "If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued,
when the character of the right sought to be forced . . . is (1) joint, or common, or
secondary . . . (3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact . . . and a
common relief is sought." For a general discussion of the applicability of the class ac-
tion to anti-segregation cases, see Comment, 20 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 577 (1953).
57. 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 3435 (2d ed. 1948).
58. Smith v. Swormstedt, 14 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
59. 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 57 at 3450. Cf. McDaniel v. Board of Public In-
struction, 39 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Fla. 1941).
60. A class action in which the interests of members of a class are several and not
interdependent, and where joinder is a matter of efficiency to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, is a spurious class action. Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C.
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949).
61. 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 57 at 3465.
62. Id. at 3445.
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action has more than a mere stare decisis effect. The fact that the litiga-
tion is a class action has a psychological value in inducing others to come
forward with their claims and perhaps causing the court to treat those
claims more liberally than ordinary action. 3
The novelty of the anti-segregation decisions may account for the
absence of the class action in transportation cases. However, the device
has been applied successfully to segregation in various other fields, such
as recreation and education," and its applicability to certain actions for
segregation in transportation seems a logical extension."
The role of the Civil Rights Act in future intrastate segregation
cases hinges on the outcome of the Flemming case. 6 At present, this act,
which affords the only remedies available in this area, depends upon the
segregation statutes to provide the vital link between the carrier's action
and the state. Without the statutes, there would be no act "under color
of law." Should the Flemming case be affirmed, the state law would be
declared invalid, and the only remedy available to redress intrastate segre-
gation would be eliminated unless another link to the state could be forged.
Such a link might be established should the carriers themselves at-
tempt to segregate their passengers. Without the authorization of state
statutes, the companies do not have the power to enforce segregation
policies. A carrier cannot deny rides to potential passengers because, as
a public utility,67 it must give service to all, regardless of race. Resort to
physical force by an operator in seating a passenger would subject him
to possible tort liability. An effort to secure the aid of local police would
place the state again in the position of enforcing segregation, and the
63. Ibid.
64. Recreation: See, e.g., Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
Education: See e.g., Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950),
aff'd, 340 U.S. 909 (1950).
65. Moore's interpretation has been attacked by Professor Chafee who suggests
that class actions be divided into two categories, the "solid class suit," and "invitations
to come in." The first would correspond, in its binding effect on members of the class
not in court, to Moore's true class suit. The latter would allow members of the class to
join themselves and thereby become bound by the outcome of the suit. Chafee lists the
following factors as tending to put an action under the solid class suit: The importance
of the common question, the policy in favor of settling it once and for all, and a lack of
distinctive individual interests which might be better served by individual actions. See
CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 243-295 (1950). Whether anti-segregation suits
would fall within Chafee's "solid class suit" is difficult to say. Certainly the require-
ments of the suit are to a great extent satisfied by the elements of an action by a group
of Negroes to secure constitutional rights. Under Chafee's analysis, it is likely that
these actions would have a binding effect on, and would be enforceable by, all members
of the Negro race.
66. 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal docketed, No. 511, 24 U.S.L. WEEH 3138
(U.S. Nov. 8, 1955).
67. See JONES & BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 62-98 (1932), for a
general discussion of the characteristics of public utilities.
NOTES
Civil Rights Act requirement of action under color of law would be satis-
fied. Thus, even segregation practices of companies in intrastate trans-
portation may be limited by the federal government.
The Interstate Commerce Act"8 specifically prohibits interstate car-
riers from discriminating among their patrons.6" Section eight provides
for recovery of damages resulting from a violation of the act"0 upon a
showing of pecuniary loss.7 The only victims of segregation who can
prove the necessary financial harm are those who, in being ejected from
restricted facilities, sustain physical injuries or loss of property. 2 If a
Negro can show the requisite damages, the act allows an election of
forum, i.e., he may complain to the commission or bring suit in a federal
district court."3 One of the principle drawbacks in taking a complaint to
the commission is the amount of time required to get a final ruling by
that body. 4 An action in the federal courts would seem more deisrable.
When a plaintiff cannot prove pecuniary loss, he may still challenge
the carrier's current regulations and seek to have them declared invalid.7"
Having been subjected to practices which violate the Interstate Commerce
Act, he may contest the carrier's regulation on the ground that it permits
68. 24 STAT. 379, 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1952).
69. From its inception the Interstate Commerce Commission has recognized the ap-
plicability of the act to discrimination against colored passengers because of their race,
and the duty of carriers to provide equality of treatment with respect to transportation
facilities. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 95 (1941).
70. 24 STAT. 379, 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1952), states that any common carrier
who violates the act shall be liable to the person injured for the full amount of damages
sustained.
71. The right to recover under section eight is limited to the pecuniary loss suf-
fered and proved. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S.
184, 206 (1912) ; Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 258 I.C.C. 413 (1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). The mere violation of the act is not enough to justify a
money judgment. Parsons v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 447, 460 (1897).
72. See, for example, Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1949) ; Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948); Soloman v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co.. 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
73. 24 STAT. 379, 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1952). However, election under this
section is not entirely free. Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 230 U.S. 247
(1912). Questions of fact requiring determination by experts with special knowledge
of transportation must be brought before the commission, but the reasonableness of a
carrier's regulation is not such a question, nor is a constitutional problem. Moore v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 98 F. Supp. 375, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
74. The process of carrying a case through all the possible appeals and rehearings
has required as long as eight years. In Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950),
the discrimination occurred in 1942. Henderson filed a complaint with the commission,
and received an adverse ruling in 1943. 258 I.C.C. 413. The district court reversed and
ordered a rehearing. 63 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1945). At the rehearing, the defendant
showed it had amended its regulation and the commission again ruled in the defendant's
favor. 269 I.C.C. 73 (1947). The district court affirmed. 80 F. Supp. 32 (D. Md.
1948). Then, on direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the regulation was declared invalid.
75. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 823-824 (1950) ; Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1941).
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the recurrence of comparable violations."8 This action saves the com-
plainant from similar treatment in the future and secures to the race as a
whole the benefits of the action-freedom from unfriendly regulations.
It might be argued that the courts should allow damages under the
act for unfair treatment resulting, not in financial harm, but in depriva-
tion of civil rights. This position loses sight of the purpose of the act-
to provide fair and impartial regulation in transportation. While an
unfair regulation may result in a violation of a Negro's rights, the Inter-
state Commerce Act is not the proper instrument to rely on for repara-
tion. The courts, in including segregation in section 3(1), have already
stretched the act beyond its intended scope.
In light of the Supreme Court's disposition of the school segregation
and the recreation cases, the demise of the separate but equal doctrine
in transportation seems a practical certainty. Strengthened with a recog-
nition of his substantive rights by the courts and with the vitalization of
remedies under the Civil Rights Act and the Interstate Commerce Act,
the Negro is given new opportunities to seek acceptance on his own merits.
VITALIZATION OF THE INDIANA CORONER SYSTEM-
CHANNELING MEDICO-LEGAL DUTIES TO THE
TECHNICALLY TRAINED
Indiana is aligned with the majority of states1 which continue to
use outdated coroner procedures, the subject of increasing criticism not
only from lawyers, prosecutors, and laymen but also from mediqal and
non-medical coroners.2 Established in 1852, the Indiana system has re-
76. Ibid.
77. New York, N.H., & H. R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 200 U.S. 361, 402 (1905).
1. GRADWOHL, LEGAL MEDICINE 71-107 (1954); NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
CORONERS IN 1953; MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, THE CORONER SYS-
TEM IN MINNESOTA (1954). In seven states, the coroner has been replaced by the medi-
cal examiner. In twelve other states, the medical examiner has replaced the coroner in
certain counties. See Ferguson, It's-Time for the Coroner's Post-Mortem, 39 J. Am.
JuD. Soc'y. 40, 43 (1955).
2. See the following newspaper accounts: Chicago Daily Tribune, Oct. 10, 1955,
Part 3, p. 4, col. 1; Stucky, Kentucky Coroner System Labeled Ridiculous, The Louis-
ville Courier-journal, Feb. 13, 1955, § 3, p. 5, col. 1. For more detailed study regarding
coroner criticism see the following: NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, A MODEL STATE
MEDIcO-LEGAL INVESTIGATIVE SYSTEM (1954); MYREN, CORONERS IN NORTH CAROLINA
(1953) ; BLAIR, THE OFFICE OF COUNTY CORONER IN KANSAS (1953) ; Ferguson, supra
note 1, at 40; Snyder, Justice and Sudden Death, 36 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y. 142 (1953) ;
Ford, Medicolegal Investigation of Violent and Unexplained Deaths, 145 J. Am. MED.
ASS'N 1027 (1951); Helpern, The Postnwrtem Examination in Cases of Suspected
Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. L. & C. 485 (1946) ; Comment, 1951 WIs. L. REV. 529; Note, 26
N.C.L. REV. 96 (1947). In connection with research on this note, all counties in Indiana
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